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Abstract—Modern advances in sensor, computing, and commu-
nication technologies enable various smart grid applications. The
heavy dependence on communication technology has highlighted
the vulnerability of the electricity grid to false data injection
(FDI) attacks that can bypass bad data detection mechanisms.
Existing mitigation in the power system either focus on redundant
measurements or protect a set of basic measurements. These
methods make specific assumptions about FDI attacks, which
are often restrictive and inadequate to deal with modern cyber
threats. In the proposed approach, a deep learning based frame-
work is used to detect injected data measurement. Our time-series
anomaly detector adopts a Convolutional Neural Network (CNN)
and a Long Short Term Memory (LSTM) network. To effectively
estimate system variables, our approach observes both data
measurements and network level features to jointly learn system
states. The proposed system is tested on IEEE 39-bus system.
Experimental analysis shows that the deep learning algorithm
can identify anomalies which cannot be detected by traditional
state estimation bad data detection.
I. INTRODUCTION
The future smart grid is designed to operate more reliable,
economical and efficient in an environment of increasing
power demand. This goal, however, is achieved by incorporat-
ing with a tremendous increase of data communications which
lead to great opportunities for a various of cyber attacks. Thus,
ensuring cyber security of the Smart Grid is a critical priority.
Although a large number of countermeasures have been pub-
lished, such as communication standards (e.g. IEC 61850-90-5
[1]), regulation laws (e.g. Colorado Regulations (CCR) 723-3),
cryptographic implementations (e.g. secure channel [7]), and
official guidelines (e.g. NISTIR 7628 Guidelines [8]), current
smart grid still remains vulnerable to cyber attacks.
To prevent cyber attacks, legacy grid relies on traditional
security scheme (e.g., firewall and general intrusion detection
system). Intrusion detection systems (IDS) are able to generate
alarms for potential intrusions by consistently monitoring
network traffic or system logs. Although there are a number
of studies on general IDS in network security community,
limited effort has been made specifically to smart grid. At
the same time, the risk of attacks targeting data availability
and integrity in the power networks is indeed real. A notable
work is by Liu et al. [16], which proposed a type of attacks,
called false data injection (FDI) attacks, against the state
estimation in the power grid. In such attacks, the attackers aim
to bypass existing bad data detection system and pose damage
on the operation of power system by intentional changing the
estimated state of the grid systems. Therefore, there is an
urgent need of effective smart grid specific intrusion detection
systems.
To address the above issues, two schemes have been widely
studied to detect FDI attacks [4], [14]: One way is to strategi-
cally protect a number of secure basic measurements. Kim
et al. [12] propose a greedy algorithm to select a subset
of base measurements and the placement of secure phasor
measurement units. Bi et al. [3] characterize the problem into a
graphical defending mechanism to select the minimum number
of meter measurements which cannot be compromised. The
other way of defending FDI attack is to verify each state
variables independently. Liu et al. [15] formulate a low rank
matrix separation problem to identify attacks and propose two
optimization methods to solve the problem. Ashok et al. [2]
present an online detection algorithm that utilizes statistical
information and predictions of the state variables to detect
measurement anomalies.
Recently, machine learning algorithms have been broadly
adopted to the smart grid literature for monitoring and prevent-
ing cyber attack of power systems. Ozay et al. [17] generate
Gaussian distributed attacks and use both supervised and
semi-supervised machine learning methods to classify attacks.
Similarly, Esmalifalak et al. [5] devise a distributed support
vector machines based model for labeled data and a statistical
anomaly detector for unsupervised learning cases. He et al.
[10] employs Conditional Deep Belief Network (CDBN) to
efficiently reveal the high-dimensional temporal behavior fea-
tures of the unobservable FDI attacks. However, existing works
mainly focus on finding bad measurement at certain state, no
prior studies have been conducted over the dynamic behavior
of FDI attack. Besides, detecting FDI attacks is considered as
supervised binary classification problem in [5], [10] which are
incapable of detecting dynamically evolving cyber threats and
changing system configuration.
Recent breakthrough in GPU computing provide the foun-
dation for neural network to go ”deep”. In this paper, we
develop an anomaly detection framework based on neural
network to enable the construction of a smart grid specific IDS.
More specifically, a recurrent neural network with LSTM [11]
cell is deployed to capture the dynamic behavior of power
system and a convolutional neural network [13] is adopt to
balance between two input sources. An attack is alerted when
residual between the observed and the estimated measurements
is greater than a given threshold.
Moreover, attackers with sophistic domain knowledge may
continually manipulate the power grid state estimation without
being detected causing extensive damages. As such, we want
to bridge the gap between network anomaly detector and
FDI attacks detection mechanism. Unlike other works which
separate two detectors, our framework combines both network
traffic characteristics and time-series data measurements with
help of convolution neural network to equalize between two
inputs. With the help of the proposed neural network structure,
our anomaly detector demonstrates highly accurate detection
performance.
We organize the rest of this section as follows: Section II
introduces the background of FDI attack and neural network.
Section III presents our combined detection system along
with the static and dynamic method to detect FDI attack in
Section III-B and Section III-C. Section IV presents the case
study on IEEE 10-machine 39-bus power system. Finally, we
conclude our work in Section V.
II. BACKGROUND
A. False Data Injection Attack
In a power system, the state is represented by bus voltage
magnitudes V ∈ Rn and angles θ ∈ ([−pi, pi])n, where n
is the number of buses. Let z = [z1, z2, ..., zm]
T ∈ Rm
be the measurement vector, x = [x1, x2, ..., xn]
T ∈ Rn be
the state vector, and e = [e1, e2, ..., em]
T ∈ Rm denote the
measurement error vector. We describe the AC measurement
model as follows:
z = h(x) + e (1)
In analyzing the impact of data attack on state estimation,
we adopt the DC model obtained by linearizing the AC model
where the relationship between these m meter measurements
and n state variables can be characterized by an m×n matrix
H. In general, the matrix H of a power system is a constant
matrix determined by the topology and line impedances of the
system.
z = Hx+ e (2)
Typically, a weighted least squares estimation is used to
obtain the state estimate as xˆ = minx
1
2 (z −Hx)
T
R
−1(z −
Hx) = (HTR−1H)−1HTR−1z where R is the covariance
matrix.
Let za represent the vector of observed measurements that
may contain malicious data. za can be represented as za =
z + a where a = (a1, ..., am)
T is the malicious data added
to the original measurements. Let xa denote the estimates
of x using the malicious measurements za. Then xa can be
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Fig. 1. An example of architecture for image classification with convolutional
neural network.
represented as xˆ+c, where c is a non-zero vector representing
the impact on the estimate from the malicious injection and
xˆ is the estimate using the original measurements. In this
paper, for target FDI attackers, we assume the attacker has
enough inside information to constructing xa while random
FDI attackers only have partial information.
B. Convolutional Neural Network
Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs or ConvNets) are
a category of Neural Networks that have been successful in
processing image and video signal such as identifying objects
in real time video and style transfer for images as visualized
in Figure 1.
CNNs describe the most classic form of neural network
where multiple nodes are arranged in layers such that infor-
mation only follows from input to output. We use three main
types of layers to build a CNN architecture: Convolutional
Layer, Pooling Layer, and Fully-Connected Layer.
In this way, CNN transforms the original input layer by
layer from the original tensor to the final output which can be
class score. In particular, each convolutional layer and fully
connected layers perform transformation that is a function of
both the parameters (weights and biases) and activations in the
input volume. The parameters in the CNN will be trained with
gradient descent optimization algorithm to minimize the loss
between the outputs that the CNN computes and the labels of
training dataset.
C. Recurrent Neural Network
Recurrent neural networks, or RNNs [19], are a family of
neural networks for processing sequential data. Contrasting
from convolutional network which is specialized for pro-
cessing high dimensional tensors such as image, a recurrent
neural network is a neural network that is specialized for
processing time-series values x(1), ..., x(t). RNNs are ideal for
long sequences without sequence-based specialization.
Recurrent neural networks use the following equation to
define the values of hidden units.
h(t) = f(h(t−1), x(t); θ) (3)
where h represent the state and x(t) refers the time-series input
at time t.
Schuster et al. [20] shows a bi-directional deep neural
network. At each time-step t, bi-directional RNN maintains
two hidden units, one for the forward propagation and another
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Fig. 2. Computation of a typical 3 layers bidirectional recurrent neural
network.
for the backward propagation. The final result, yt, is generated
through combining the score results produced by both hidden
units. Figure 2 shows the bi-directional network architecture,
and (4) show the formulation of a single bidirectional RNN
hidden layer.
−→
h (t) = f(h(t−1), x(t);
−→
θ ) (4)
←−
h (t) = f(h(t+1), x(t);
←−
θ ) (5)
1) Long Short-Time Memory: Currently, the most com-
monly implemented RNNs fall into the class of long short-time
memory (LSTM) neural networks [11]. Different from vanilla
RNN with single gate, LSTM exhibits notable performance
gain for preserving long time dependencies while also keeping
short time memories. Each LSTM cell involve three gates to
which are input gate i, output gate o, the forget gate f . The
information flow of LSTM cell is as follows:
ft = σg(Wfxt + Ufht−1 + bf ) (6)
it = σg(Wixt + Uiht−1 + bi) (7)
ot = σg(Woxt + Uoht−1 + bo) (8)
ct = ft ◦ ct−1 + it ◦ σc(Wcxt + Ucht−1 + bc) (9)
ht = ot ◦ σh(ct) (10)
where σg(·) and σc(·) represent the sigmoid and tangent
function respectively, and ◦ denotes the element-wise product.
Here, c and h stand for the cell state vector and hidden unit
vector.
III. DETECTING DATA LEVEL FALSE DATA INJECTION
ATTACK
Various research on static FDI attack detection method has
been published. A common assumption is a threat model
where the attackers have knowledge of the power system
topology; however, can only inject a limited number of bad
data points which is shown in Figure. 3a. In this threat
model, FDI attack can be mitigated if a proportion of the
comprised substation is below a certain threshold. Moreover,
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Fig. 3. Different scenario for dynamic FDI attacks.
data measurements are often redundant for estimating the
actual state. This threat model is widely adopted in existing
works. Nonetheless, we stress this threat mode by: 1) removing
the limitation of the number of measurement data that are cor-
rupted; and 2) assuming the attackers have basic understanding
of the aforementioned static detection mechanism in (11).
Figure 3b shows the dynamic FDI attack that is focused in
this work. The attack starts at t = 3 and the measurements
of both bus 2 and 3 have been compromised. Static method
will fail in this scenario, for the reason that two thirds of the
measurements have been modified from t = 3 to t = 6. A
sophisticate attacker can deliberately generate a false event
based on a real event and inject it to the power grid. As the
result, it is unlikely to detect this attack only based on static
method which can cost catastrophe results if control center
makes false actions.
A. The Combined Attack Detection Method
In this section, we provide an overview of our proposed
system for detecting FDI attacks in Figure 4. Our proposed
detection mechanism mainly consists of a static detector and
a deep learning based detection scheme. The static detector
can be an State Estimator (SE) or any aforementioned FDI
attack detector [2], [3], [5], [10], [15], [17], [12] which is built
independently beyond our dynamic detector. As mentioned in
the previous section, the dynamic detector takes two input
sources. While the data level features are explicit, the network
packages are captured by tcpdump and each network packet
includes header and data payload, with unique features which
defined in NSL-KDD dataset [22]. The NSL-KDD dataset has
41 features which are categorized into three types of features:
basic, content based and traffic-based features. It should also
be mentioned that some features are generated based on a fixed
window (default is 2 second) which will remain consistent
within the window.
Our dynamic detector is employed to recognize the high-
level time-series features of the FDI attacks. To achieve
this goal, our time-series method consists of two essential
mechanisms: offline training and online detection. The offline
training is trained based on historical measurement and can
be potentially facilitated by outsourcing to public machine
learning cloud services. Unlike other methods which are
designed under the assumption that the physical status of the
power system does not change overtimes, our system will
collect real-time measurement data to support offline training
and the prediction model will update after retrain is completed.
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Fig. 4. The overview of our proposed deep learning based FDI attacks
detection system.
B. State Estimator Method
In bad data injection attack, one method is to use Chi-
squares test. Once bad data are detected, they need to be elim-
inated or corrected, in order to obtain the correct states. There
are two important hypothesis that are the largest normalized
residual (LNR) and the J(xˆ) performance index:
J(xˆ) < τ (11)
where J(xˆ) follows a chi-square distribution and τ is a
preset threshold. The threshold can be obtained from the χ2
distribution. If J(xˆ) > τ , bad data will be suspected. For
DC model, diag(σ−2i , 0) = I , the traditional bad data detec-
tion approaches often reduce to l2-norm of the measurement
residual [16]:
‖z −Hxˆ‖2 < τ (12)
C. Dynamic Detection Method
In [9], the authors formulate the bus voltage magnitudes,
angles and states of measuring devices together as system
states in Markov Decision Process (MDPs). In our method,
we extend to a recursive model where the decision not only
depends previous one state but previous n states where the
loss is as follows:
η = L(φ(st), f(φ(st−1, ......, st−n−1), θ), τ) (13)
where φ, θ are parameters need to be turned and τ is the
threshold that is needed to decide whether the attack has been
started.
Figure 5 shows the structure of our stacked dynamic de-
tection model. Specifically, the input of the model are the
time-serious power system data, the features will be passed
to several LSTM layers to learn high dimensional temporal
features. Previous works [6], [10] characterize FDI attacks
as a binary classification problem which looks promising in
the experimental setting, since the datasets to be tested can
be manually tuned for different scenarios. In real world im-
plementations, power system data is highly unbalanced, thus,
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Fig. 5. The time-serious dynamic detection method based on RNN.
binary classification methods will inevitably have low recall
even the overall accuracy is high. However, for evaluating IDS,
recall is often more important than accuracy since any cyber
attack can cost catastrophe results.
In general, our dynamic anomaly detector takes the input of
time-series ..., x(t−1), x(t), ..., learn their higher dimensional
feature representations, and then use those features to predict
the next data point xˆ(t). Furthermore, the predicted data point
can be used to classify if x(t) is anomalous by checking the
similarity between the actual data x(t) and predicted data xˆ(t).
Having presented single source FDI attacks detection model,
we now introduce a framework that combines FDI attacks
detector with network intrusion detection system. This frame-
work is dealing with a case when an IDS that relies on
data measurement fails to detect the start of FDI attacks.
Accordingly, if the fabricated injection data are derived from
a legitimate measurement in our threat model, data level
detectors may fail to determine if current network is intruded
or not. In this case, to increase the overall performance of time-
series anomaly detection model, a combined attack detection
method is proposed in this paper.
Specifically, the schematic structure of the combined frame-
work is given in Figure 6. As seen in the figure, the combined
framework is rather straightforward. An alternative method
to combine data level information and packet level features
is directly concatenate the input vector. However, because
the dimension between the data measurements and network
packet features differ significantly, direct concatenation may
have minimal improvement than aforementioned time-serious
methods. Alternatively, each level features are transformed by
a convolutional neural network before concatenation as shown
in the figure. The purpose of adding additional convolutional
neural network is to equalize the dimension between data mea-
surement and packet level features and their respect weights
are learned using gradient descent (Adam algorithm is used in
our experiments). Inception deep learning architecture [21] is
advised when possible.
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Fig. 6. The combined detection method with both network package and data
measurement inputs.
IV. CASE STUDY ON IEEE 39 BUS SYSTEM
In this section, we provide several key implement details of
our proposed FDI attack detection system, thereby providing a
better intuition about its capabilities and limitations. Figure 7
shows IEEE 10 generator 39 bus power system and details
in [18]. In the 39 bus system, the state vector x ∈ R39
is composed of the voltage, current and frequency of the
individual buses. The communication network is emulated
using two computers where one computer represents the
Independent Service Operator which collect data measurement
through Ethernet. The sample rate is set to 10Hz. The FDI
attacks are generated from man-in-middle attackers from a
client-server communication structure and two input sources
are time synchronized to make it possible for real time
implementation. The dynamic detector is configured with 3
layers bi-directional RNN with LSTM cells and trained using
Pytorch. In this experiment, to better evaluate our dynamic
detector, our system does not implement SE.
Fig. 7. IEEE 39 bus power system.
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Fig. 8. The accuracy of detecting FDI attacks for different the number of the
compromised buses.
which are randomly chosen to generate Gaussian distributed
attack vectors a ∼ N (0, 0.5). We also test the scenario that
the attacking vectors are derived from real measurement which
will fail to be detected by most state-of-art detectors. In this
experiment, the attackers try to inject a false generator trip
event which is collected in advance and we define attacking
capability as k
n
where n is the total number of measurements.
We evaluate the performance of our dynamic FDI attack
detection framework on the classification results for the test
set. We train a neural network with 10 training epochs to
minimize the loss function in Equation 13. For the experiment,
we apply a 60% / 20% / 20% train / validation / test split, with
a grid search to determine the best τ .
We illustrate the results of our anomaly detection system in
Figure 8. From the figure, it is clear that our proposed detection
mechanism can achieve the detection accuracy above 90% for
random FDI attacks when k
n
is high. However, we also notice
that our system has low accuracy when attacking power is low.
In fact, this can be resolved by incorporate a SE detector (such
as [17], [10]) which work well for limited attacking capability.
In other words, our proposed two-level detection scheme is
able to achieve high detection accuracy for different scenarios.
For target FDI attacks, the injected data streams are carefully
manipulated from real event which is not considered for most
SE bad data detection schemes. Our experiment validates that
dynamic features and network anomaly detector integration
can support IDS for better performance. The simulation result
in this case study also implies that the full deep knowledge
of the power system is not required for the success of our
dynamic detection scheme. Our system can be built at early
stage of an electricity network.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose a deep learning based frame-
work to detect measurement anomalies due to FDI attacks.
We described our detection methodology that leverages both
convolutional neural network and recurrent neural networks.
Our model learns normal behavior from normal data and is
unrelated to certain attack, and thus can detect unseen attacks.
Additionally, our two-level detector is robust using hybrid
features and can detect attack when state vector estimator fails.
We provided key insights about various factors that impact
the performance of the proposed algorithm. We presented a
detailed case study of the proposed algorithm on the IEEE
39-bus system.
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